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Pierre Ozer et Florence de Longueville
The tsunami in South-East Asia – a
retrospective analysis of the management
of an apocalyptic natural disaster
Introduction
1 The earthquake rating 9.3 on the Richter scale that occurred in the Indian Ocean on December
26th 2004 was the second most violent earthquake recorded since 1900 (Stein & Okal, 2005;
Munich Re, 2005). Along a fault line of around 1200 km, the tectonic plates collided and
the Indian plate was forced under by the Burma plate, which rose by ten metres on average,
forming a subduction zone (Ni et al, 2005). It was this tectonic movement that caused the
tsunami, which in a few hours caused nearly 226 000 deaths, the equivalent of all the natural
disasters of the previous ten years, and the displacement of more than one and a half million
people living on the coastlines of twelve countries and two continents (Table 1).
Table 1: Countries affected by the tsunami, number of dead, missing, total1 and displaced
persons (statistics for 6th May 2005)
Continent/Country Number of dead Number missing Total Number of displacedpersons
Asia            
Indonesia 128645 37063 165708 532898
Sri Lanka 31147 4115 35262 519063
India 10749 5640 16389 638297
Thailand 5395 2845 8240 NA
Maldives 82 26 108 11568
Malaysia 68 6 74 8000
Burma 61 0 61 2592
Bangladesh 2 0 2 0
Africa            
Somalia 150 NA 298 5000
Tanzania 10 NA 10 NA
Seychelles 3 NA 3 40
Kenya 1 NA 1 NA
Total 176313 49695 226008 1717458
(Sources: USAID, 2005; AFP, 2005)
2 One terrible aspect of this disaster was its suddenness. Most of the people close to the beaches
and shorelines who were unable to retreat quickly to higher ground were drowned, as for
example in the province of Aceh in the extreme north of the Sumatra. On January 14th 2005,
more than 110 000 dead were reported, compared to just 1400 people hospitalised for minor
injuries – fractures, open wounds for the most part (Pincock, 2005). The non-serious nature of
injuries was confirmed in Thailand, where only 0.3% of the injured sent to hospital failed to
survive (Watts, 2005). The situation was similar in India, where, three weeks after the disaster,
very few of the 30 000 injured in the tsunami were still hospitalised (Chatterjee, 2005). Again
in the area of health, the widely dreaded epidemics much discussed after this natural disaster
(Brauman, 2005; Van Rooyen & Leaning, 2005) did not develop (WHO, 2005). However
what unanimously mobilised the medical community was the impact of psychological trauma,
difficult to quantify, on the local populations, following the cataclysm (Silove & Zwi, 2005), so
that psychological follow-up was thought to be necessary over several years (Hampton, 2005).
3 The disaster had unprecedented impact on the levels of Western public generosity. NGOs
collected more money between Christmas and the New Year than over the whole of the
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previous year (Debarbieux, 2005). The role of the media, which, as for the September
11th attack, fed public the public ever-hungry for morbid images with continuously looping
coverage of the catastrophic scenes, certainly has something to do with the emotional impact
and the popular mobilisation (de Longueville & Ozer, 2005). As an example, the special
televised news broadcast on December 27th devoted to the tsunami, and mainly targeting
Western victims, was the most watched broadcast of the year 2004 in French-speaking
Belgium, with more than 900 000 viewers.
4 The humanitarian mobilisation that followed was also impressive. Thus on February 14th 2005
as many as 97 NGOs, 42 governmental organisations and 25 international organisations were
present in the island of Sumatra alone (Reliefweb, 2005) – unprecedented in the history of
humanitarian aid. For these various reasons, numerous observers went as far as to describe
this cataclysm as the first globalised natural disaster (Anonyme, 2005a; Debarbieux, 2005).
By way of the analysis of this natural disaster, this paper sets out to explore the challenges
of the management of tsunami-related risks. Firstly we will return to one major controversy
concerning this natural disaster, which was the absence of a tsunami warning system in the
Indian Ocean. Secondly, options for prospective management of this risk (territorial planning,
education) will be explored, because the implementation of a warning system is only one
component in risk reduction strategies (Bird & Lubkowski, 2005; Pons, 2005a).
The absence of a tsunami warning system in the Indian
Ocean
5 The idea of the need for a tsunami warning system fuelled wide debate in the aftermath of
the disaster in the Indian Ocean. The controversy concerning responsibilities in this disaster
were perfectly foreseeable, as after most natural events. Thus after the storm of the century,
named "Lothar", which devastated vast regions across Europe at the end of 1999 (Bresch el
al, 2000), all eyes and all criticism focused on Météo-France, the meteorological office, who
had not broadcast a warning bulletin for this unprecedented disaster. In December 2003 after
the earthquake in Bam, all fingers were pointing towards the Iranian authorities for having
failed to invest in anti-seismic building technologies, and in the establishment of emergency
plans (Munich Re, 2004). In the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami, many of the observers and
specialists expressed indignation at the absence of a warning system (Marris, 2005).
6 This point has nevertheless been one of the main subjects of controversy in connection
with this disaster. Indeed, a survey carried out in the immediate aftermath among 500 civil
engineers specialised in geo-risk shows that an appreciable proportion of the respondents
(34%) considered that it was not relevant to invest in a tsunami warning system in the Indian
Ocean (Parker, 2005).
7 There are different reasons for this uncertainty as to the efficacy of a warning system in South-
East Asia, and more particularly the Indian Ocean.
8 The first relates to the rarity of events of this type on the coasts around the Indian Ocean.
Indeed, with the exception of countries with shores on the Pacific, the natural risk associated
with tsunamis has been little studied because of their very infrequent occurrence in the course
of recent centuries. This also explains why the latest world map of natural risks merely outlines
the coasts historically affected by tsunamis, without the systematic analysis of the risk that
is performed for other types of natural disasters (Berz et al, 2001). Further to this, a recent
analysis of the tsunami risk worldwide estimated that the period for the return of a wave
10 metres high, that is to say on a scale similar to, or rather smaller, than the one that occurred
on December 26th 2004, was of the order of 1000 years for the Indian Ocean, just as it is thought
to be for the North Atlantic (Schiermeler, 2005b). Other sources (Carré, 2005) show that in the
long term it is the Pacific Ocean that has seen 75% of the tsunamis recorded, well ahead of the
Mediterranean (12%), the Atlantic (9%) and the Indian Ocean (3%). In fact none of the shores
devastated in the recent tsunami was confronted with the risk over the last 120 years (Figure 1,
Brauner et al, 2005). It is true that the tsunami caused by the eruption of Krakatoa in 1883 was
registered on the coasts of Sri Lanka and India, but the wave was never higher than one metre
(Choi et al, 2003), compared to the waves of 5 to 12 metres in December 2004 (Chadha et al,
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2005; Liu et al, 205, Yalciner et al, 2005). It should be recalled here that the remembrances of
disasters are the main instrument for foreseeing and guarding against natural risks (d'Ercole &
Dollfus, 1996). In addition to this, the few recent tsunamis that affected Indonesia (Flores in
1992, western Java in 1994, and Biak in 1996) claiming some 2700 victims only concerned the
eastern part of the country. This very low probability of occurrence of tsunamis in the Indian
Ocean explains why in June 2004 the coastal nations refused the Japanese offer to establish a
tsunami warning system in the region (Parker, 2005). If solely the period of probable return
of this type of risk is considered, it seems unjustified to criticise the political decision-makers
in these recently devastated countries.
9 The generally small numbers of victims in tsunamis is probably another reason that influenced
the under-estimation of the risk. Thus from 1900 to 2003 only 8 tsunamis caused the death
of more than 1000 people, and none caused more than 5000 deaths (Table 2). Compared to
other types of natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes) occurring yearly across Asia,
these figures are small.
10 The ten largest disasters related to tsunamis since the start of the 20th century yield a total
of less than 20 000 dead. These figures also cast light on the very exceptional nature of the
disaster of December 26th 2004.
Table 2: The ten most deadly tsunamis since 1900
Date Main regions affected Deaths
26/12/2004
Indonesia (Sumatra), Sri Lanka,




02/03/1933 Japan (Sanriku) 3060
21/05/1960 Chile, USA (Hawaii), Japan 3000
12/12/1992 Indonesia (Flores) 2500
17/07/1998 Papua New Guinea 2400
20/12/1946 Japan (Nankaido) 2000
05/11/1952 Russia (Paramushir island,Kamchatka) 1300
07/12/1944 Japan (Honshu) 1000
31/01/1906 Ecuador, Colombia 500
(Source: Munich Re, 2005)
11 The third reason suggested by certain specialists is that the devastated Indonesian coastlines
were extremely close to the fault that caused the tsunami (about 200 km). Therefore 43 minutes
after the earthquake (Boen, 2005) the wave had already hit Sumatra, with heights ranging
from 4 metres in Meulaboh to nearly 35 metres in Lhok Nga (Boen, 2005; Tsuji et al, 2005;
USGS, 2005b). The town of Banda Aceh found itself under 5 to 12 metres of water (Borrero,
2005; USGS, 2005a; USGS, 2005b). According to several experts, this would not have allowed
sufficient time for a detailed analysis of all the information required to issue a reliable forecast
of the scale of the tsunami, identifying the zones threatened, and then to launch the alert
(Munich Re, 2005b; Parker, 2005).
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Figure 1: Geographical distribution of wave heights for tsunamis from 1883 to 2003, and
shorelines probably hit by wave heights of over 2 metres in the tsunami of December 26th
2004
(After Brauner et al, 2005 and Schiermeler, 2005a)
12 As a comparison, after the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 which caused the greatest seismic
disaster ever recorded in Western Europe (100 000 dead) the tsunami took 16 to 30 minutes
to sweep across the coast of the Algarve, 30 minutes to reach Lisbon, and 26 to 34 minutes to
devastate the town of Safi in Morocco (Chester, 2001). If a tsunami similar to the Asian "big
one" had occurred earlier in Europe, what would have been the consequences in countries,
where the very word tsunami was unfamiliar to the general public? This being said, it is
probable that thousands of lives could have been saved in India and Sri Lanka if the transfer
of information and warnings had been operational (see Table 3 below).
13 The last reason generally given is the irrelevance of the establishment of an early warning
system that can be efficient in societies possessing optimally functioning information networks
(such as the USA and Japan), in view of the reality of daily life in several of the countries
hit by the disaster in the Indian Ocean (Bird & Lubkowski, 2005; Ozer, 2005). To illustrate
this, a chronology positioning the salient events observed in the first hours after the seismic
tremor is presented in Table 3. If we look at this chain of events, the most striking aspect is the
slow rate at which information relating to the tsunami risk reached key individuals who might
have taken concrete action in the field. Thus the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC)
tried in vain to contact their Indonesian colleagues in Jakarta, at a time when the wave had
already ebbed from Sumatra. And anyhow, would things have been very different if a scientist
in Jakarta had been warned, even in good time? How would the information have reached
Banda Aceh? And once it got there, how could the information have been issued massively to
the population of the main town, and to the villages along the coast, often without telephones?
14 Following this disaster, there was to be not one tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean,
but four....Thus India allocated funding of 29.106 US$ for the protection of its coastline.
Germany envisaged devoting 40.106 US$ to establishing a tsunami warning system for the
Indonesian shorelines, while Thailand planned its own coastal protection. The United Nations
for their part were to allocate 40.106 US$ for a system covering the Indian Ocean, to be
operational from June 2006. They also undertook to establish a global warning system by June
2007 (AFP, 2005a; Cyranoski, 2005; Jayaraman, 2005). It goes without saying that if efforts
are not coordinated, and without a pooling of all the data required for a reliable diagnosis of the
situation (Anonyme, 2005c; Cyranoski, 2005) the confusion could be enormous. In addition, it
can also be wondered what system could be established in the space of a few months, when the
USA and Japan have taken more than 20 years to develop and validate digital models for the
prediction of the trajectories of tsunamis in the Pacific Ocean, essential for a reliable warning
system (Synolakis, 2005).
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Table 3: Chronology of events following the quake under the floor of the Indian Ocean
Chronology Events reported
00:59 GMT
An earthquake of magnitude 9.0 on the Richter scale
occurs in the sea west of the island of Sumatra causing
the tsunami
Earthquake + 00h08'
Seismic signals from the earthquake recorded in
Australia reach the (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
(PTWC) in Hawaii. The alarm is raised.
Earthquake + 00h15'
PTWC issues a bulletin indicating that an earthquake of
magnitude 8.0 on the Richter scale has occurred, without
risk for the Pacific nations. The USGS (United States
Geological Survey) circulates the information internally
Earthquake + 00h25' USGS revises the magnitude to 8.2
Earthquake + 00h30' The tsunami hits the west of the island of Sumatra
Earthquake + 00h43' The tsunami hits the town of Banda Aceh
Earthquake + 01h00'
The PTWC issues a second bulletin revising the
magnitude of the earthquake to 8.5 and identifies the
possibility of a local tsunami close to the epicentre.
PTWC attempts to warn colleagues in Indonesia,
without succeeding. Australia is alerted
Earthquake + 01h10' The tsunami hits Thailand
Earthquake + 01h30' The Indonesian authorities in Jakarta finally receive thesecond PTWC bulletin
Earthquake + 02h00' The tsunami hits the east of Sri Lanka
Earthquake + 02h15' The tsunami reaches India
Earthquake + 02h25'
The Indian meteorological office faxes warning bulletin
to the science and technology Ministry. But it is a wrong
number
Earthquake + 02h30' The first information relating to the tsunami and itsvictims appears on Internet
Earthquake + 02h45'
The Indian Meteorological Office faxes a warning
bulletin to the Ministry of the Interior. The message is
received.
Earthquake + 03h00'
The United States ambassador in Sri Lanka takes the
initiative of establishing permanent contact with PTWC
so as to be able to warn the local authorities directly in
case of secondary quakes
Earthquake + 03h30' The tsunami reaches the Maldives
Earthquake + 03h45' Bangkok issues a bulletin for fishermen warning of thepossibility of waves of 5 metres
Earthquake + 04h00' Members of the Federal Government in New Delhi areinformed of the disaster
Earthquake + 04h25' The Seismic Department in Harvard University revisesthe magnitude of the earthquake to 8.9
Earthquake + 07h15'
The PTWC informs the American State Department
of the potential threat of a tsunami in Africa and
Madagascar. At the same moment the tsunami reaches
Somalia.
Earthquake + 14h30'
The PTWC warns that the waves are likely to reach the
Pacific countries. In the hours following, waves reach
a height of 50cm in places in Chile and on the coasts of
North America
Earthquake + 3 months
The journal Nature publishes the results of Stein & Okal
(2005) who revise the magnitude of the earthquake to
9.3
(after Boen, 2005; Delbecq et al., 2005; Marris, 2005; Orfanogiannaki et al., 2005; Schiermeler, 2005a; Stein & Okal,
2005)
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Territorial development integrating the tsunami risk
15 In all events, the existence of a tsunami warning system can hardly be more than a means
to restrict losses (Kempf, 2005a). It needs to be accompanied by measures for appropriate
coastal management in the risk-prone areas. Thus the American National Tsunami Hazard
Migration Program recommends seven measures to reduce the effects of tsunamis on property
and persons (NTHMP, 2001):
• Knowing a community's tsunami risk: hazard, vulnerability and exposure. The city of
Heraklion (Crete) has thus developed a very detailed plan not only of exposed zones,
but also of the most vulnerable spots. To do this, the study integrated numerous factors
relating to the structure of the habitat and the physical environment into a GIS, and also
gathered socio-economic data (Papathoma et al, 2003).
• Avoiding new development in tsunami run-up areas to minimise future tsunami losses.
• Opting for specific developments in zones exposed to tsunamis by work on specific sites
(for instance, raising levels)
• Applying specific building standards to new buildings (resistance to wave impact,
consolidation of foundations etc) so as to minimise damage by tsunamis. In Banda Aceh,
the work by Boen (2005) did indeed show that the buildings constructed according to
anti-seismic specifications resisted the tsunami, while the others were shattered by the
wave.
• Protecting existing buildings and infrastructures in the exposed zones by anti-tsunami
embankments or walls, which, although costly and not attractive to the eye, have proved
efficient, in particular in certain exposed bays in Japan (Pons, 2005a, 2005b).
• Taking specific precautions when establishing infrastructures that are needed during
crises (hospitals, fire stations, civilian protection etc).
• Drawing up evacuation plans. Here there are two possible solutions: firstly "horizontal"
evacuation, consisting in withdrawal inland towards high ground, and secondly
"vertical" evacuation, consisting in finding refuge in the upper storeys of buildings. This
second solution is recommended when the time for horizontal evacuation is very short,
when the population density is very high, and when the means for horizontal evacuation
((roads, bridges etc) are few, or in the case of islands with few relief features (e.g. the
Maldives). In zones where buildings are not very high, the construction of high platforms
in coastal villages can be envisaged. This was indeed the chosen option in the last decade
in the Ganges delta in Bangladesh (Kempf, 2005b), an area chronically affected by
flooding and tropical cyclones causing temporary rises in water levels.
16 It can be wondered if measures of this type are a judicious use of financial resources. Indeed,
while it is probable that the construction of more robust buildings is not economically viable to
guard against exceptional events such as a major tsunami occurring only every 1000 years, it is
nevertheless important to underline that measures of this sort would also substantially reduce
losses in case of earthquakes and storms, which are for their part frequent events in the region.
17 To a certain extent, it would appear that the authorities in the countries affected have partly
taken in the lessons of the tsunami. Sri Lanka, for instance, has declared that it is now forbidden
to build less than 300 metres from the coast, while in India, the no-build zone is no longer
applied to the first 500 metres, but to the first kilometre (Anonyme, 2005b). In Aceh province,
Sumatra, the authorities have gone even further. All the coastal towns are to be moved inland
and protected from the sea by a buffer zone of two kilometres. Inside this buffer zone, it is to
be forbidden to build houses, office buildings, markets or shopping precincts. The buffer zone
is to be divided into three parts. The first, 300 metres deep and protected from the sea by a
dyke, will comprise mangroves, palms and pines. The second, measuring 1600 metres is to be
exclusive to fishermen, and the last strip 100 deep will be planted with trees (Sukarsono, 2005).
18 These decisions can only be welcomed, but it seems important to temper enthusiasm. Globally,
it does seem difficult to enforce regulations of this sort in countries in the South where
fishing is one of the resources enabling populations to survive in the coastal areas. In addition,
"spontaneous" settlement is widespread, especially in zones suffering internal armed conflict,
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as in northern Sumatra (Fau, 2005). It therefore seems complicated to enforce the strict
application of certain measures of territorial development. And this is all the more so as
the memory of the disaster fades, becomes deformed, and progressively disappears (d'Ercole
& Dollfus, 1996), making it less and less likely that regulations will be observed. Another
important aspect is that the decision to outline a buffer zone of two kilometres applies only to
Aceh province. This all too well illustrates the fact that decisions are reached to reduce risk
only after an actual disaster, which shows a lack of political perspicacity and/or determination,
and a lack of understanding of the risk. We will thus have to wait for another Indonesian island
to undergo a coastal disaster for it to use the example of Aceh province to redevelop (assuming
the Aceh model is a success).
The education of the population in the risk culture
19 There is a general consensus regarding the need to establish educational programmes targeting
the general population so as to instil a certain risk culture and to ensure that prevention reflexes
are well established (Delbecq, 2004; United Nations, 2004). This should mainly target the
education of children, who are very vulnerable to this risk, starting in primary school, in
particular using strip cartoons (ITIC, undated); periodic evacuation exercises should also be
implemented. In this way, the next time the coastal populations feel an earthquake and see the
sea receding abnormally for a few minutes, they will know it is time to take refuge inland or
on high ground. It takes only a short time to register this simple notion, but it can save lives. A
study conducted among Western tourists who witnessed the disaster on the islands of Phuket
and Phi Phi in Thailand are a good illustration. It reports that a seismic tremor was felt slightly,
and that one hour later the sea receded by 200 to 300 metres for 2 to 5 minutes before a tsunami
of 10 metres swept 400 metres inland (Orfanogiannaki et al, 2005). The time available to these
tourists to cover so short a distance inland was in fact ample to save all the lives that were lost,
if the prevention reflex had been present.
20 On the coasts of Japan, Hawaii or certain coastlines of the USA every person knows what to
do in case of tsunami alert. Even if no warning is issued, but the person feels a tremor, he or
she will know how to act. Thus Sugimoto and colleagues (2003) showed that in case of an
earthquake in the close vicinity, losses in human lives could be reduced by 10 or 15% if the
populations started evacuation 15 minutes before the arrival of the tsunami. Losses would be
virtually nil if the wave arrived 30 minutes after the quake. If the 165 000 dead in Sumatra
are compared with these expected results when the notion of the tsunami risk has been fully
integrated, it is clear that training and education are priceless.
21 Officers also need to be trained in the efficient diffusion of the information they possess and
warnings received. For this purpose, a coordination centre able to contact the right people
at any time should be established. In the USA, there is specific training for such officers
(Beaulieu, 2001). It covers all the procedures to adopt for warnings to be issued in the most
efficient manner.
Conclusion
22 Overall, it can be feared that the natural hazards threatening coastlines will increasingly
become disasters of great magnitude, because vulnerability along coasts has increased
markedly in recent decades, following the massive settlement of populations close to the sea,
mainly for economic reasons. Desperately seeking new space along the coasts, these new
arrivals settle regardless of the ecosystems which are in themselves buffer zones acting as very
efficient brakes on tsunamis, and also on cyclones, which are events that are far more frequent
in the region (Dahdouh-Guebas et al, 2005).
23 The analysis of the tsunami of December 26th 2004 highlights a string of malfunctioning in
the management of the disaster in the first hours after the earthquake. The historical study
of tsunamis in the Indian Ocean explains why there was no early warning system in South-
East Asia. It has also been shown that this type of system alone could not have saved the
165 000 victims in Indonesia. However, the application of well thought-out measures of
territorial development integrating the tsunami risk, and the development of a certain risk
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culture in the populations by way of educational programmes, could have considerably reduced
vulnerability.
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Notes
1 Five months after the disaster, the different countries considered the missing persons dead.
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Abstract
 
The tsunami that affected the coasts of the Indian ocean on December 26, 2004 claimed close
to 226 000 lives, mainly on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia, which suffered overwhelming
devastation. This article asks whether a tsunami warning system is needed in the Indian Ocean,
where the probability of experiencing a similar catastrophe is very small. In addition, other
alternatives, including land use planning and education focused on tsunami risk management,
are presented. Their application could considerably reduce financial and human losses if a
disaster of this nature was to occur again.
Keywords :  education, hazard, tsunami, natural risk, vulnerability, risk management, warning system,
land use planning, south-east Asia
